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Abstract
I document how the organizational form of a mutual fund affects its investment
strategies. I show that centralized funds tilt their portfolios to hard information com-
panies whereas decentralized funds tilt their portfolios to soft information companies.
I also show that the investments of decentralized (centralized) mutual funds in soft
(hard) information companies outperform those of centralized (decentralized) funds.
Moreover, decentralized funds show ability to forecast soft information companies’
future returns and a disability at forecasting hard information companies’ future re-
turns. On the other hand, centralized funds do not seem to be able to forecast the
returns of hard information companies, but they show disability at forecasting hard
information companies’ future returns. The results corroborate the main predictions
of Stein (2002). The results also shed light on the increase in demand for large
stocks and the positive relationship between performance of portfolio concentration
documented in the literature.
JEL classification: G14, G17, G23, L22
1 Introduction
Information collection is a central part of investing. As suggested by several economists,
the collection of information can ameliorate the adverse selection problem faced by in-
vestors2. It has also been argued that organizational form plays and important role in
providing incentives to collect information. Stein (2002) describes how decentralized
organizations are better at providing incentives to collect soft information (informa-
tion that is difficult to put in a numeric score) and centralized organizations are better
at incentivizing agents to collect hard information (information that is quantitative in
nature). Therefore, while collecting information is a very important part of investing,
organizational form may dictate the kind of information that is optimal to collect.
The main objective of this study is to explore whether organizational form causes
mutual funds to tilt their portfolios towards certain companies based on the type of
information (soft/hard information) these companies generate. I also study whether
centralized (decentralized) mutual funds are better than decentralized (centralized)
funds at investing in companies that mostly generate hard (soft) information. Fur-
thermore, I investigate whether decentralized (centralized) mutual funds are able to
forecast returns of soft (hard) information companies held by them.
Stein (2002) develops a theoretical framework to model the effect of organiza-
tional design (i.e. hierarchy/centralized, decentralized structure) on the collection of
information in firms where division managers compete for internal funds to finance
their projects. If research and capital allocation decisions are carried out by differ-
ent agents (as it is the case in centralized organizations: division managers collect
information on investment projects, CEO allocates funds across divisions), division
managers will know that the only information a CEO will use in the capital allo-
2Stiglitz and Weiss (1980) show that asymmetric information may explain why capital does not
flow to firms with positive net present value projects. Lelan and Pyle (1977), Campbell and Kracaw
(1980), Diamond (1984), Haubrich (1989) Diamond (1991) describe how large institutional creditors
can partially overcome the problem of adverse selection by producing information about firms and
using it in their credit decisions
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cation process is information that can be credibly transmittable (hard information:
quantitative/verifiable information such as sales growth rate over the past 5 years).
This, in turn, means that any effort exerted in collecting information that can not
be credibly transmittable, or soft information (information that can not be easily
agreed upon, i.e. honesty of a CEO), will go to waste. Division managers will know
this ex-ante and will re-direct all his efforts to collect hard information. Further-
more, competition amongst division managers for (limited) internal funds will make
division managers to collect as much (hard) information as possible on their invest-
ment projects, thereby creating vast amounts of (hard) information. The CEO will
analyse all (hard) information provided by the division managers and will allocate
funds across divisions optimally. In a decentralised organization research and capital
allocation will be conducted by the same agent (division managers collect informa-
tion on projects and decide on a capital allocation strategy). In this case, division
managers have all incentives to collect as much information possible on their invest-
ment projects. Stein shows that if all information about investment projects is hard
centralised organizations have an advantage over decentralized firms. On the other
hand, he also shows that is all information about investment opportunities is soft,
decentralized organizations will have superior fund allocation across projects than
centralized firms.
Actively managed US equity mutual funds provide an ideal environment to analyze
the effects of organizational diseconomies in information collection and capital allo-
cation for several reasons. Firstly, investing is a task that is information intensive.
Moreover, due to disclosure requirements, it is possible to measure fund organiza-
tional characteristics, and the information opaqueness (hard vs. soft information) of
funds holdings. Stein’s model provides many insights in the way the organizational
structure affects the collection of information and the capital allocation process in
mutual funds. If the organization structure affects the incentives to collect informa-
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tion, mutual funds with highly hierarchical/centralized organizational forms will tend
to tilt their portfolio towards companies that generate a lot of hard information. Con-
versely, decentralized funds will tend to tilt their portfolios towards soft information
companies. Additionally, decentralized funds will be better than centralized funds at
investing in soft information companies since they are better equipped to utilize this
information in the capital allocation process. Furthermore, if hierarchical funds tend
to produce vast amounts of (hard) information, they should be able to profit from the
information collected if they can keep it private. If this is the case, hierarchical funds
should be better than decentralized funds at investing in companies that produce a
lot hard information. I also conjecture that decentralized funds are not only better
than centralized funds at investing in soft information companies, but they are also
good at it, i.e. they are able to forecast soft information stocks’ returns whereas cen-
tralized funds are not. A similar argument should also hold for centralized funds: if
information collected remains private, centralized funds will be able to forecast hard
information stocks’ returns while decentralized funds will not.
If the organizational form of funds and the informational ”softness” of stocks held
by mutual funds were observable, it would be straight forward to test the hypotheses
above. The problem is that these characteristics are not observable. In this paper,
I construct scores that measure the organizational structure of a mutual fund and
the type of information available about publicly traded companies. I measure orga-
nizational complexity of a fund by creating a score based on the number of managers
in the fund, the fund’s assets under management, the number of equity funds and
the assets under management of the family to which the fund belongs. The first two
variables measure the level of organizational complexity at the fund level and the
other two variables measure the level of organizational complexity at the family level.
I include organizational complexity at the family level, because fund families have
incentives to control the investments of their sibling funds (See Gaspar, Massa and
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Matos (2006), Cici Gibson Moussawi (2006)). If this is the case, the portfolio allo-
cation at the fund level would be influenced by the management team of the family
to which the fund belongs. This creates the kind of separation between research and
decision making that lead managers to steer efforts to collect hard information. In
order to measure the type of information available about publicly-traded companies,
I construct a proxy using market capitalization, age, number of analyst reports avail-
able and institutional ownership. The first two variables measure the nature of the
information available to the public. The other two variables measure the extent to
which information about a company has been hardened.
My findings support the hypotheses above. I find that the organizational com-
plexity of a fund positively co-varies with the weighted average information score of
its portfolio. In other words, the more centralized a fund is, the more it tends to hold
hard information companies. In addition to that, decentralized funds are better than
centralized funds at investing in soft information companies. For instance, construct-
ing a self-financing trading strategy consisting of a long positions in a portfolio of soft
information companies held by decentralized funds and a short position in a portfolio
in soft information companies held by hierarchical funds results in a (5-factor) risk
adjusted return of 0.55% per month (6.8% per year). On the other hand, centralized
funds are also better than decentralized funds at investing in hard information com-
panies, however, to a lesser extent. The weakness could be explained by the fact that
hard information is transmittable, and therefore, difficult to contain. Inability to keep
information private decreases the chances a manager has to earn abnormal returns.
Additionally, decentralized funds are able to forecast soft information stock returns.
For instance, an increase of one standard deviation in the average abnormal portfolio
tilt of decentralized funds in a soft information stock forecasts an additional 13 bps
in the stock monthly return. Centralized funds do not seem to predict the returns of
hard information companies. This last piece of evidence seem to support our previ-
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ous conjecture: hard information is difficult to contain and therefore, it is difficult to
earn abnormal profits by trading on it. Moreover, decentralized and centralized funds
show an important and statistically significant disability when investing in hard and
soft information stocks respectively.
The distinction between soft and hard information has been studied before in the
banking literature, with particular emphasis on the incorporation of soft and hard
information in different lending technologies (i.e. credit scoring, relationship lending)
by different organizational forms (large vs. small banks).3 One of the main conclu-
sions in this strand of the literature is that large banks tend to be at a disadvantage
when lending to small businesses. The reason given is that large banks are very cen-
tralized and small businesses tend to be informationally opaque (they mostly produce
soft information). The disadvantage emerges from the fact that centralized organiza-
tions are ill-suited to use soft information.4 However, Berger Rosen and Udell (2007)
argue that past empirical research in this area is inconclusive since some variables of
interests were not considered. Therefore the evidence in the banking literature on the
effects of organizational form on the collection and usage of information is mixed.
Chen et al (2004) look at the issue of organizational diseconomies in the delegated
asset management industry. They examine a particular cross-section of the data,
September 1997, and find that small funds are more likely to invest in local stocks
and are better at investing in them than large funds. Moreover, they find that the
more managers a fund has, the less the fund invests in local stocks (companies whose
head quarters are geographically close to the fund’s main offices). They present
this evidence as an indication that decentralized funds (small funds) are better at
collecting and using soft information companies and as evidence in favor of Stein’s
3For a more detailed discussion on the subject see the papers surveyed in Berger Rosen and Udell
(2007).
4However, Berger and Udell (2006) have pointed out that large banks (hierarchies) may have
developed lending technologies that allow them to lend to opaque businesses (soft information com-
panies). Examples of these lending technologies are small business credit scoring asset-based lending,
factoring, fixed assets lending and leasing (See Berger and Udell (2006))
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(2002) model. However, they do not look at the other implications of Stein (2002),
namely whether hierarchical funds tilt their portfolios to hard information stocks and
whether they are better at using hard information. One of the problems with their
setup is that they measure organizational complexity with fund size which is a very
noisy proxy for organizational complexity and it neglects the effect of fund families
in the way sibling fund operates. For instance, Gaspar Massa and Matos (2006) and
Cici Gibson and Moussawi (2006), document that fund families have the incentives
and mechanisms to influence the capital allocation of its sibling funds. This creates
the kind of separation between research and decision making found in centralized
organizations. Chen et al (2004) also measure organizational complexity with the
number of managers that run a fund. While number of managers may be a better
way to measure the separation of research and decision making than fund size, it still
neglects the effects of a family in the way a fund operates. Furthermore, Chen et
al do not attempt to measure the information opaqueness (soft / hard information)
of stocks. As described in Berger Rosen and Udell (2007), not incorporating such
information may result in biased results.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the hypotheses. Section 3
describes the data, section 4 presents the results and section 5 concludes.
2 Theory and Hypothesis Construction
2.1 Soft and Hard Information
Petersen (2004) presents a detailed characterization of hard and soft information in
finance. Hard Information is the kind of information that can be easily reduced to
numbers. Examples of hard information in finance are financial statements, credit
history, and stock returns. On the other hand, one can think of soft information as
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information that can not be completely summarized in a numeric score. Examples
of soft information in finance can be opinions and rumours. Due to its quantitative
nature, hard information can be easily collected, stored and transmitted (these char-
acteristics also make it difficult to contain). A second dimension used by Petersen to
characterize information is the way in which it is collected. The collection of hard
information need not be personal. Therefore, the collection process can be at arms
length, automated and standardized. However, it places restrictions on what can
be collected. With soft information, the context under which it is collected and the
collector of the information are part of the information itself. For instance, if I say
the manager of a firm has great business acumen, the information depends on my
definition of business acumen. One of the advantages of hard information is that it
can lower production costs through standardization and automatization. Hard in-
formation is easy to store as the information does not depend on who collected it.
This means that the information remains in an organization even if the agent who
collected the information leaves the firm. However, collection of hard information
also leads to a loss of information which in some contexts can be quite important
(i.e. venture capital). Moreover, the fact that hard information is difficult to contain
can keep managers from fully collecting informational rents (i.e. in the case of equity
investing, it reduces the ability an investor has to earn abnormal returns).5
2.2 Hypotheses construction
Motivated by Stein (2002), I conjecture that the organizational form of a mutual fund
affects managers’ incentives to collect information. This should be reflected in the
kind of stocks that managers pick and in their ability to choose stocks with different
5Petersen also notes that soft information can be hardened and cites credit scoring as an example.
In addition, he presents examples of hardening of information (Mercantile Agency, R.G.Dun, and
Bradstreets in the 1840) and explains how the evolution of financial markets over the last forty years
has been in part a replacement of soft information with hard information as the basis for financial
transactions
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degrees of information ”softness”.
Hypothesis 1. Centralized mutual funds should tilt their portfolios towards hard
information stocks.
Hypothesis 1 follows from the fact that incentives to collect information are af-
fected by organizational form. As stated before, fund managers that operate in cen-
tralized funds (where research and decision making are conducted by different agents),
will know that they will not be able to credibly transmit soft information. Ex-ante,
they decide to only collect hard information. Therefore, one can expect that the port-
folios of these funds will be tilted towards companies that produce hard information.
On the other hand, we should expect decentralized funds not to have this tilt towards
hard information stocks.
Hypothesis 2. Decentralized (centralized) funds are better than centralized (decen-
tralized) funds at investing in soft (hard) information companies.
If decentralized funds are better suited than centralized funds at collecting and
using soft information, they should have a superior ability to invest in soft information
stocks than centralized funds. On the other hand, centralized funds should be better
than decentralized funds at investing in hard information companies since they are
better at gathering and incorporating hard information.
Hypothesis 3. Decentralized funds should be able to forecast the future returns of
soft information stocks they hold. Centralized funds should be able to predict future
stock returns of hard information companies they own. However, decentralized (cen-
tralized) funds should exhibit a disability to invest in hard (soft) information stocks
Decentralized funds should not only be better than centralized funds at investing
in soft information stocks but should also be able to generate abnormal returns in
their soft information stock investments. For instance, high decentralized mutual fund
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ownership of a soft information stock should forecast higher expected returns than for
an average soft information stock. A similar argument could be made for centralized
funds: high centralized fund ownership of a hard information stock should predict
higher expected returns. However the inability that decentralized (centralized) funds
have to gather and utilize hard (soft) information should result in a disability to invest
in this type of stocks.
3 Dataset Construction and Methodology
3.1 Information Variables and score construction
As suggested by Petersen (2004), one can think of hard and soft information as a
continuum of information ”softness” rather than as two separate categories. More-
over, Petersen also points out that information can be harden. A good example of
information hardening is credit scoring. Nowadays, financial institutions use credit
scores to try to quantify the credit worthiness of loan applicants. Without these mod-
els, quantifying the credit worthiness of an applicant would be difficult. The score
I construct aims at measuring the information ”softness” of a firm and the extent
to which information about a company has been hardened. The score is based on
four variables. The first two variables, market capitalization (SIZE) and age (AGE),
measure the information softness of a firm. These variables have been previously
used in the banking industry and the main idea is that information available about
older and larger firms tends to be harder than information generated by younger and
smaller companies. The other two variables, number of analyst forecasts (NUM EST)
and institutional ownership (OWN), measure the extent to which information about
a company has been hardened. The basic premise is that these two variables measure
the level of due diligence on a company. For instance, it is plausible to think that
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there is more hard information about a company followed by 50 analysts than by a
company without analysts coverage.
Table 1 presents some summary statistics on the variables used to construct the
information score (Size, Age, Number of Analyst Estimates and Institutional Owner-
ship). It also contains summary statistics on stock return predictors book-to-market
(B/M, its natural logarithm), firm-level volatility (VOL), and turnover (TURN). All
statistics are calculated cross-sectionally each quarter and are then averaged across
time. These statistics are calculated for stocks held by mutual funds. A few points
a noteworthy. First, the strong positive correlation between all the information vari-
ables indicates that constructing a score based on the ranking of the raw values of
these variables does not make the best use of this information. For instance, sorting
stocks by NUM EST would be largely similar to sorting them by Log SIZE. Therefore
this correlation structure between the variables will have to be taken into considera-
tion when constructing the information score.
3.1.1 Information Score
The construction of the information score for each stock is based on the ranking
of its information variables values. However, as noted before, if the raw values of
the variables were used, the four rankings for each stock would not differ much. It
is also clear that all the variables tend to be correlated with size. For instance,
institutional ownership is highly correlated with size. This finding is consistent with
other papers (Gompers and Metrick (2001), Nagel (2005)). The same is true for
Number of Analyst estimates and Age. To try and purge the size effect from the
other information variables, the construction of the information score employs the
residuals of AGE NUM EST OWN as sorting variables. The residuals are obtained
by regressing the variables on size. This orthogonalization of the information variables
is similar to the one used in Hong et al (2000) and Nagel (2005). Since institutional
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ownership is bounded between 0 and 1, it is necessary to transform the variable so
that it maps to the real line. I perform the following logit transformation,
Logit(OWN) = log
(
OWN
1−OWN
)
(1)
where the values below 0.0001 and above 0.9999 are replaced with 0.0001 and 0.9999
respectively. The information variable residuals are calculated by regressing the in-
formation variables on Log Size and squared Log size. On average, across all quarters,
I find the following relations:
Logit(OWN) = −7.31 + 1.68 Log size− 0.09 Log size2 +  (2)
NUM EST = 2.13− 1.90 Log size + 0.43 Log size2 + 
Log AGE = 4.44− 0.25 Log size + 0.035 Log size2 + 
Each quarter, I take the universe of NYSE stocks and rank them in 20 groups by size
and residual age. I use the NYSE size and residual age rank cut-off points to rank
stocks held by mutual funds. I also rank stocks held by mutual funds in 20 groups
by residual institutional ownership and residual number of analysts estimates. For
each stock, I then calculate an aggregate information variable by summing up the
ranks of the four variables for each stock. For instance, if a stock belongs to size
group 1, residual age group 2, residual institutional ownership group 2 and residual
number of analyst estimates group 10, the aggregate information variable equals 15.
Next, I rank stocks by this aggregate information variable each quarter in deciles.
The information score will be equal to the aggregate information variable decile.
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3.2 Mutual Fund Variables and Hierarchy Score
The main objective of the hierarchy score is to measure the organizational complexity
of a fund. As mentioned earlier, there are two dimensions to consider, the actual
centralization of tasks within the fund and the actual organizational complexity of the
fund family to which the fund belongs. To measure the actual level of organizational
complexity within the fund, I use is the number of managers that control the asset
allocation (NUM MGRS) and net assets under management (AUM). As far as number
of mangers, the premise is that funds with many managers will tend to be team-
managed. This, in turn, causes managers to decide on an asset allocation based
on consensus, which is the kind of separation between research and decision making
process cited in Stein (2002). Regarding net assets under management, the main idea
is that larger organizations are more hierarchical, since large organizations tend to
centralize activities. This variable has also been used in Chen et al (2004) to measure
the organizational complexity of mutual funds. The third and fourth variables I use
are the number of funds (NUM FUNDS) and the total assets under management in
actively managed US equity funds (FAM SIZE) of the family a fund belongs to. These
variables are motivated by papers in fund cross-subsidization and fund proliferation
(Massa (2003) and Gaspar Massa Matos (2006)). The idea is that maximizing fee
income at the family level is different from maximizing fee income at the fund level.
This will lead families to cross-subsidize funds that are the most likely to benefit from
the convex relationship between past performance and current net flows documented
in Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Sirri and Tufano (1998). Families will also try to
enhance the performance of funds that maximize the positive spill over effect a top-
performing fund has on the its sibling fund net flows (Nanda et al (2004)). Therefore
fund families have incentives to cross-subsidize fund returns in other to maximize
their own income fee. As such, it is reasonable to believe that the asset allocation of
a fund will be influenced by its family. This creates the separation between research
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and fund allocation mentioned in Stein (2002).
Table 2 presents some summary statistics on the variables used to construct the
hierarchy score and on other mutual fund variables of interest. We can see that
the number of managers is not highly correlated with any other hierarchy variable.
However, NUM FUNDS, AUM and MGMT SIZE are highly correlated. For instance,
sorting funds on AUM would produce similar results to sorting funds on MGMT
SIZE.
3.2.1 Hierarchy Score
As indicated above, the variables Number of Funds, Family Size and AUM are highly
and positively correlated. Therefore a hierarchy score based on a function of the indi-
vidual rankings based on the raw values of the hierarchy variable would not provide
much extra information. For instance ranking funds by AUM would produce a very
similar ranking if funds are ranked by Family size. I therefore, orthogonalize the
number of funds with respect to AUM. I also orthogonalize Family Size with respect
to AUM and Number of Funds. On average, across all quarters, I find the following
relations:
LogNUMFUNDS = 1.64 + 0.074 Log AUM + 0.013 Log AUM2 +  (3)
LogFAMSIZE = 2.04 + 0.40 Log AUM + 0.0004 Log AUM2
+1.81 Log NUM FUNDS− 0.034Log NUM Funds2 + 
Each quarter, I rank funds by AUM, residual number family funds, and residual
family size in six groups. I calculate an aggregate hierarchy variable by summing
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up these rankings and the number of managers (which takes values from one to six).
For instance if a fund belongs to AUM group 1, residual number of funds group 2,
residual family size group 2 and it has 3 managers, the aggregate hierrachy variable
equals 8. Each quarter, I rank funds by this aggregate hierarchy variable in deciles
each quarter. The hierarchy score will be equal to its aggregate hierarchy variable
decile.
3.3 Data
Data on stock returns and prices are from the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP) Monthly Stocks File for NYSE, Amex, and NASDAQ stocks. I eliminate
closed-end funds, real estate investment trusts (REIT), American Depository Re-
ceipts (ADR), foreign companies, primes, and scores. I exclude stocks below the
20th NYSE size percentile from the tests that look at stocks returns due to the well-
documented asset-pricing anomalies in small stocks (Griffin and Lemmon (2002)).
Market capitalization is defined as the product between share price and shares out-
standing. Age is defined as the number of months that a security is present in the
CRSP Monthly File. Data on institutional holdings are obtained from the Thomson
Financial Institutional Holdings (13F) database. I extract quarterly holdings starting
in the first quarter of 1993 and ending in the last quarter of 2006. I calculate the share
of institutional ownership by summing the stock holdings of all reporting institutions
for each stock in each quarter. Stocks that are on CRSP, but without any reported
institutional holdings, are assumed to have zero institutional ownership. Ownership
greater than one are omitted as they could be a result of double-reporting by institu-
tional investors. The number of analysts estimates is calculated using I/B/E/S. At
the end of a company’s fiscal year, I count the maximum number of one-year EPS
estimates that were outstanding during the fiscal year in question. NUM EST is the
maximum number of one-year EPS estimates in the most recent fiscal year.
14
As stock return predictors, I use book-to-market (B/M), firm-level volatility (VOL),
and turnover (TURN). The book value of equity in the nominator of B/M is taken
from the Compustat Database, and it is defined as in Daniel et al (1997). At the end
of each quarter t, I calculate B/M as the book value of equity from the most recent
fiscal year-end that precedes the previous June divided by the market value of equity
at the end of quarter t. Consistent with Fama and French (1993), I exclude firms
with negative book values.
Organizational characteristics of mutual funds are taken from the CRSP Survivor-
Bias-Free US Mutual Fund Database. I identify all share classes issued by mutual
funds using the MFLINKS provided by WRDS and calculate the mutual fund char-
acteristics at the funds level, not at the share class level. The sample starts in the
first quarter of 1993 and ends in the last quarter of 2006. I calculate the number of
managers by counting the different names in database manager field. The funds in
my sample have a maximum of 5 names in the database manager filed. However, for
some funds, the manager field is set to ”Team Managed”. If this is the case, I set the
variable ”number of managers” equal to six to indicate that team managed funds are
the most hierarchical ones in the cross-section. Assets under management equals the
total TNA of the fund’s share classes. The number of actively managed US equity
funds per family is calculated at the end of each quarter. The family size variable is
the sum of all actively managed US equity funds TNA offered by a family.
Data on Mutual Fund Holdings is obtained from the Thompson Financial Mutual
Fund Database. I also eliminate funds that, on average, have not invested at least
70% of their holdings in or that have less than 20 holdings from the CRSP universe
defined above. This leaves funds that mainly invest in US stocks. Furthermore, I
eliminate portfolio holdings with extreme portfolio weights (greater that 70%) since
they are likely to be errors. I obtain pricing information for holdings from CRSP
Monthly Stocks File.
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I merge the holdings data and the mutual fund organization data for funds that
report on quarter-end dates. I use the MFLINK tables provided by WRDS. This
filters out some non-US actively managed equity funds. Additionally, I screen out
index funds by looking for the word index and abbreviations in the CRSP fund name
variable. I eliminate index funds, since passive investment is not based on information
but on minimizing tracking error with respect to a benchmark. I also check that the
MFLINK matches between the unique identifiers in the CRSP Mutual Fund Dataset
and the unique identifiers in the Thomson Financial Mutual Fund Holdings database
correspond to funds managed by the same management company. This eliminates
erroneous MFLINK matches. As an additional check on the accuracy of the MFLINK
matches, I eliminate funds for which the TNA reported in the TFN database is not
between 1/1.3 and 1.3 of the TNA reported in the CRSP database.
4 Results
4.1 Determinants of information score
My first hypothesis indicates that centralized mutual funds will tilt their portfolios
towards hard information companies. In order to determine whether centralized funds
tend to invest in the higher spectrum of the information score, I calculate value
weighted average of the information score of all holdings in a fund’s portfolio.
Table 3 Panel A regresses the value weighted average information score contem-
poraneously on hierarchy score. From the regressions in Panel A, we can see that
the mean of the average information score of a fund is above 6. This means that
funds, regardless of their hierarchy structure, tend to own companies in the higher
side of the information score (the score goes from one to ten and has a median of
five). According to Stein’s model, this is to be expected as any mutual fund is an
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organization and as such it has some degree of hierarchy complexity. Model 1 shows
that the hierarchy score positively covaries with the information score as predicted
by the theory.
It is important to note that the average information score may be determined
by other variables. For example, it is sensible to expect that the investment style
followed by a fund will influence the type of companies held in its portfolio. Aggressive
growth funds tend to hold companies that are younger and smaller. On the other
hand, income funds may be interested in companies that generate high dividends.
These companies tend to be old and large. To control for style, I create dummies
for the self-reported investment style followed by each fund. More specifically, I
create dummies for the investment style GROWTH, and GROWTH AND INCOME
/ BALANCED. The other investment style is AGGRESSIVE GROWTH which is
used as the base style in the regressions. Furthermore, net flows can also have an
impact in the information score. If a fund experiences high net flows, it will have to
allocate the new funds rather quickly as their investment styles may not allow the fund
to hold cash reserves above a certain threshold. As pointed out in Pollet and Wilson
(2006), in the face of growth, funds tend to scale up their original holdings. The pace
with which funds add (or subtract) new holdings seems to be rather slow. Therefore,
net flows should affect portfolio holdings of existing positions and thus the value
weighted average information score. Models 2 to 4 control for these variables. The
first interesting fact is that the effect of HIERARCHY remains virtually unchanged.
One can see that the average hierarchy score positively covaries with the average
information score after controlling for the other variables of interest. Moreover, the
more growth oriented a fund is, the lower the average information score. For instance,
the average information score of an aggressive growth fund is 6.30 while the average
information score for a growth and income / balanced fund is 7.68. It is also important
to note that net flows have an effect on the average information score. For instance,
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other things being equal, a one standard deviation shock in the FLOW variable in
Model 3 leads to a change of 0.20 in the average information score. Past net flows
have a similar effect.
One of the potential problems of this specification is the difficulty to establish a
causality relationship between hierarchy and weighted average information score of a
fund. Hypothesis 1 indicates that the degree of centralization of a funds (hierarchy
score) should have an effect on the type of stocks held in its portfolio (i.e. soft vs
hard information stocks). However the tests above do not rule out that the effect
is the other way around, i.e. the average information ”softness” of stocks held in
a mutual fund portfolio has an effect on a fund’s organizational complexity. For
instance, one could argue that funds decide to concentrate in a sub-set of stocks (i.e.
soft information companies) and then decide on a hierarchy structure. In other to
address these concerns, I regress the contemporaneous average information score on
past hierarchy score and on control variables. The results are shown in Table 3, Panel
B and C. Panel B lags the explanatory variables by 6 months while Panel C does it
for a full year. The results corroborate my previous findings: centralized funds tend
tilt their portfolios towards hard information stocks.
4.2 Relative performance of centralized and decentralized
mutual funds
Hypothesis 2 states that decentralized (centralized) funds should better at investing
in soft (hard) information stocks than centralized (decentralized) funds. In order to
test this hypothesis, I construct a self-financing trading strategy that exploits the
outperformance of centralized (decentralized) funds in the hard (soft) information
universe of stocks. Stein’s theory is constructed around the idea that there are soft
and hard information only. My approach measures information ”softness” as a con-
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tinuum. In order to test the insights of Stein’s model, I define soft information stocks
those that belong to the bottom decile of the information score distribution (i.e. in-
formation score distribution = 1). Stocks that are in the top decile of the distribution
(information score = 10) are labelled as ”hard information stocks”. I apply a similar
strategy with the organizational complexity of funds. Funds in the bottom quintile of
the hierarchy score (hierarchy score = 1) are called decentralized funds and funds in
the top quintile of the distribution (hierarchy score = 5) are called centralized funds.
From the cross-section of stocks held by mutual funds, I identify the set of soft infor-
mation stocks held by centralized and decentralized mutual funds respectively. The
first self-financing trading strategy takes a long position in an equally-weighted port-
folio made of soft information companies held by decentralized funds. This purchase
is financed by short selling an equally-weighted portfolio composed of soft information
stocks held by centralized funds. The return of this self-financing trading strategy is
measured every month and rebalanced every quarter. Panel A in Table 4 shows that
the average monthly return of this trading strategy is 0.41 % or 5 % a year for the
sample. I also regress the return time series on known risk factors. For instance, the
5-factor risk adjusted return is 0.33% a month (4% a year) and is significant at the
10% level.
Similarly, I implement a self-financing trading strategy that aims at exploiting the
relative outperformance of centralized funds over decentralized funds in the group of
hard information stocks. The trading strategy consists of buying an equally-weighted
portfolio of the universe of hard information stocks held by centralized funds financed
by short-selling an equally-weighted portfolio made of the universe of hard informa-
tion companies held by decentralized funds. As before, I keep track of the monthly
returns of the self-financing trading strategy, and I rebalance it every month. Panel
B shows the results for the second trading strategy. As one can see, the strategy
delivers positive returns albeit economically small (0.36% a year). One can infer from
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these results that decentralized funds tend to be better at picking soft information
companies. Centralized funds are better at picking hard information companies but
the relative outperformance is not very strong.
The degree by which a funds load on to a holding should indicate the fund man-
agers beliefs about the holding’s future performance. For example if a manager
strongly believes that IBM stock returns will be high, the manager will overweight
this security is its portfolio selection. Likewise, if a manager is not very confident
about the future performance of a long position, it is likely that the manager will not
overweight it. Therefore, a more direct test of relative performance of centralized and
decentralized funds is to incorporate this information in the trading strategy. There-
fore, I rebalance the portfolio weights of the trading strategies’ to reflect the aggregate
beliefs of managers in each organizational structure. The new weights are based on
the average ”investment intensity” that each organizational structure assigns to each
stock. I define the ”investment intensity” of a fund on a holding, as the difference
between the portfolio weight of that holding and the fund’s average portfolio weight.
A large and positive difference indicates that the fund is very confident about the
positive future performance of the holding. In contrast, a large and negative dif-
ference indicates that the fund’s management team is not as bullish on a position.
I calculate the average ”investment intensity” for all the soft and hard information
stocks held by decentralized and centralized funds respectively. I then normalize the
average ”investment intensity” of all the holdings in each of the trading strategies’
long and short portfolios. I used the normalized average ”investment intensity” as
the new portfolio weights. For instance, if all decentralized funds invest only in two
soft information stocks, namely stock A and B, and their average ”investment inten-
sity” across all decentralized funds are 1.5 and 0.5 respectively, the portfolio of soft
information companies held by decentralized funds will have portfolio weights of 75%
and 25% in A and B respectively. Furthermore, assume that all centralized funds
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only invest in stocks A and B as well and that the average ”investment intensities”
are 1 and 2 respectively. Therefore, the portfolio of soft information companies held
by centralized funds has weights of 0.33% in stock A and 0.67% in stock B. In this
example, the first self-financing trading strategy buys a portfolio of soft information
companies held by decentralized funds (with portfolio weigths of 75% in A and 25%
in B) and funds this investment by short-selling a portfolio of soft information stocks
held by centralized funds (with portfolio weigths of 33% in A and 67% in B).
Panel A of Table 5 presents the return for the soft information stock trading
strategy. This trading strategy achieves an average monthly return of 0.55% or 6.80%
a year. This average return is higher than that of the equal-weighted trading strategy
presented in Table 4. Moreover, the statistical significance of the results are stronger.
For instance the 5-factor risk adjusted average monthly return is 0.51% or 6.30%
a year and the result is significant at the one percent level. This reinforces my
previous finding: Decentralized funds tend to be better than centralized funds at
investing in soft information companies. On the other hand, the second trading
strategy shows that centralized funds are not fundamentally better than decentralized
funds at investing in hard information stocks. The average return of this trading
strategy is 0.01% a month and it is not statistically significant different from zero. One
possible explanation to this fact is that it is very difficult to generate abnormal returns
when using hard information. The reason lies in the nature of this information. For
instance, if a particular piece of information is hardened by an analyst at a research
firm, this (hard) information will be shared with many fund managers who, in turn,
will act upon it, thus eliminating any mispricings very quickly. Soft information is
more likely to remain private as it can not be credibly transmitted.
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4.3 Fund-by-fund trading strategy
One of the objections to the trading strategies implemented above could be that
they do not control for investment style. For instance, if decentralized funds tend
to be growth funds and growth companies tend to be soft information companies,
then one could argue that the results above partially show that growth funds tend
to be better at picking growth stocks. To address this concern, I implement a strat-
egy based on holdings at the fund level. For decentralized and centralized funds
(hierarchy score equal to one and five respectively), I re-calculate a fund-specific in-
formation score for the stocks held by each mutual fund (I exclude stocks below the
20th NYSE size percentile). I form a trading strategy for each fund by going long an
equally-weighted portfolio composed of its hard information companies (fund-specific
information score equal to ten) and short a portfolio made of its soft information
companies (fund-specific information score equal to one). Every month, I aggregate
the trading strategies by averaging the returns for the universe of decentralized and
centralized funds respectively. For every month, I calculate the difference between
the average return of the centralized fund trading strategies and the average return of
the decentralized fund trading strategies. I rebalance the fund-specific strategies at
the end of the quarter. In other to rule out funds that only invest hard or soft infor-
mation companies (top and bottom deciles of the cross-sectional information score),
I exclude funds that do not hold at least α% of companies that are below or above
the median of the cross-sectional information score.
This implementation controls for investment style since the trading strategy is
based on the holdings of individual funds as opposed to the holdings of all funds
of a particular organizational structure (i.e. goes long growth stocks, shorts growth
stocks). Since the trading strategy buys portfolios of hard information companies
and short-sells portfolios of soft information companies, the difference between the
average return of the centralized fund trading strategies and the average return of the
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decentralized fund trading strategies should be positive since the average return of the
centralized fund trading strategies should be positive and that of the decentralized
funds should be negative. The results in Table 6 confirms this conjecture. Each
panel in Table 6 presents the results for different levels of alpha. We can see that
the difference of these averages goes from 0.22 % a month (2.27% year) to 0.61% a
month (7.57% per year). Risk adjusting these differences do not change the results
much as the strategies do not load significantly on known risk factors. Therefore,
controlling for investment style still reveals evidence of superior investment skill of
some organizational structures in stocks with different levels of information ”softness”.
4.4 Cross-sectional regressions
Hypothesis 3 conjectures that decentralized funds are able to extract informational
rents from soft information companies. In other words, since these funds are able to
collect and incorporate soft information in their asset allocation process, their supe-
rior information should be reflected in the outperformance of their soft information
holdings. Likewise, centralized funds should be able to use their superior information
to pick hard information companies with high future returns. Hence, the aggre-
gate level of ownership by different organizational structures should tell us something
about the future performance of soft and hard information stocks. For instance, if
the majority of decentralized funds overweights a particular soft information stock, it
should be because the managers of these funds obtained positive (soft information)
signals about the future performance of the stock. Therefore, I argue that the aver-
age ”investment intensity” of decentralized funds should forecast the returns of soft
information companies (High average intensity of investment of decentralised funds
should forecast high future expected returns for soft information stocks). The same
argument works for centralized funds and hard information companies: high aver-
age intensity of investment of centralised funds should predict high future expected
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returns for hard information stocks.
To explore whether ownership of soft and hard information stocks by centralized
and decentralized funds predicts the cross-section of stock returns, Table 7 presents a
series of cross-sectional regressions of returns of stocks held by mutual funds (I exclude
stocks below the 20th NYSE size percentile). Cross-sectional regressions are run every
month from April 1993 to March 2007. Dependent variable is the return from month
t to t+1, which is regressed on month t stock characteristics. The stock predictors
I employ are book-to-market ratio (B/M), the total individual stock return over the
previous 12 months (RET12), the monthly trading volume scaled by the number of
shares outstanding averaged across the previous three months (TURN), the standard
deviation of monthly individual stock returns over the previous 12 months. To test my
hypothesis, I construct two variables that measure the average intensity of investment
of decentralized funds (DEC) and of centralized funds (CEN). I also include dummies
for soft and hard information stocks. Because some of the predictors do not have
well-behaved distributions I use their natural logarithm (DEC, CEN, B/M, TURN).
In the first column of Table 7 (Model 1), future returns are regressed on four
predictors (B/M, RET12, TURN, and VOL). The results are consistent with previous
results in the literature. It is important to remember that return predictability is
stronger at long horizons. Therefore, it is not surprising to see some well-known
predictors with the right signs, but statistically insignificant (VOL and TURN). We
can see that B/M (Value indicator) and RET12 (Momentum indicator) predict future
returns with important levels of statistical significance. Model 2, controls for the
average return of hard and soft information companies by adding dummies for hard
and soft information stocks. We can see that on average hard information stocks
(information score equal to 10) do not have a very different average return from
other stocks. Soft information stocks tend to have lower returns (15 bps per month)
than other companies. However this difference is not statistically significant. Model
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3 directly test my hypothesis above. I do this by interacting the hard and soft
information dummies with the average intensity of investment of centralized funds
(CEN) and decentralized funds (DEC), where decentralized and centralized funds are
defined as before. The idea is to see the marginal effect of the average intensity of
investment of different organization designs (centralized and decentralized funds) on
stocks of different information softness (hard and soft information stocks)
Model 3 tells us that future expected returns of a soft information stocks are
higher when the intensity of investment of decentralized funds are higher and lower
when the intensity of investment of centralized funds are higher. More specifically, the
coefficient on HARD X DEC in Model 3 implies that ownership of hard information
stocks by decentralized funds forecast an additional -0.46% a month (- 5.6% per
year) for every unit of DEC. However the ownership of soft information stocks by
decentralized funds (SOFT X DEC) forecast an additional 0.48 % per month (5.9%
per year) for every unit of DEC. This corroborates my initial conjecture, decentralized
funds are able to exploit their organizational advantages to process soft information
to pick good soft information stocks. Moreover, decentralized funds display a strong
disability at investing in hard information companies.
Model 3 also shows that future expected returns of hard information companies are
lower when the average intensity of investment of decentralized (DEC) and centralized
(CEN) funds are higher. The coefficient on HARD X CEN shows that ownership of
hard information stocks by centralized funds tend to forecasts an additional return of
-0.30 % per month (-3.65% a year) for each unit of CEN. On the other hand, ownership
of soft information stocks by centralized funds forecasts and additional return of -0.59
% per month (-7.3% per year) for each unit of CEN. This shows that centralized funds
display an important disability at investing in soft information companies. This is due
to the organizational diseconomies described before: centralized organizations can not
incorporate soft information in the decision making process. Moreover, centralized
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funds show no particular ability at investing in hard information companies. This also
points out to the fact that it is difficult to earn informational rents when information
can not be kept private. In other words, centralized funds can not earn abnormal
returns on their hard information stock investments since it is difficult to contain
their ”superior” (hard) information on investment prospects.
5 Conclusion
I tests the predictions of Stein (2002) in a sample of actively managed US equity
funds. I also develop scores that measure the information ”softness” of stocks and
the organizational complexity of mutual funds. I find that the level of organizational
complexity of a fund positively covaries with its average information ”softness” of its
holdings. I also document that decentralized funds are better than centralized funds
at investing in soft information stocks. The ability of centralized fund to outperform
decentralized fund in the hard information universe of stocks is less pronounced.
Decentralized funds also seem able to pick soft information stocks with high expected
returns and show an important disability when investing in hard information stocks.
Centralized funds show no particular ability when investing in hard information stocks
and show a large and important disability when investing in soft information stocks.
The first set of results indicates that hierarchical funds tilt their portfolios towards
hard information stocks. This confirms Stein’s insight in that, since the only infor-
mation that can be transmitted is hard information, hierarchical funds rely more on
it and therefore tilt their portfolios to stocks for which most the information available
is hard. This relationship between organization and information helps explain the in-
crease in demand for large stocks (usually hard information companies) documented
in Gompers and Metrick (2001) and the consequent reversal of the small stock risk
premia over the last 30 years. The surge of institutional investors and the growth
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of the delegated asset management industry, has given rise to complex hierarchical
(centralized) organizations as investment vehicles. As explained before, hierarchies
tend to be heavy users of hard information which is precisely the kind of information
produced by large companies. The rise of these hierarchies as investment vehicles
may also help explain the replacement of soft information with hard information as
the basis for financial transactions documented in Petersen (2004).
I document that the soft information holdings of decentralized funds perform
better than those of centralized funds. Similarly, the hard information holdings of
centralized funds outperform those of decentralized funds. However the out perfor-
mance is not as strong and pronounced. The last set of results show how decentralized
funds have a special ability to choose soft information companies while centralized
funds show a disability in this respect. Once again, this confirms the inferences made
from Stein model in that the collection of soft information in a hierarchy would not
be utilized. If this information can not be used in the investment decision process, it
is expected to see that funds that do not use this type of information do badly when
investing in soft information companies. As far as hard information companies, nei-
ther centralized nor decentralized shows an special ability at investing in these stocks.
However, centralized funds seem to do better than decentralized funds. Decentral-
ized funds show a much greater disability when it comes to invest in hard information
companies. This last fact still shows that Stein model provides a good prediction for
hard information stock investment by different hierarchical structures. The fact that
centralized funds show no special ability when investing in hard information stocks
reflects the difficulty of earning abnormal earnings when information can be easily
transmittable.
One last important point is noteworthy. My results help explain why concen-
trated funds tend to outperform diversified ones 6. As we have seen, decentralized
6Kacperczyk Sialm and Zheng (2005) argue that concentrated managers outperform diversified
ones and that the effect is more pronounced amongst managers that hold portfolios concentrated in
27
funds tilt their portfolios towards soft information stocks. Since soft information is
not transferable, collectors of this information have a longer first mover advantage
relative to collectors of more transferable information (i.e. hard information). In Van
Nieurwerburgh and Veldkamp (2008), investors who can first collect information sys-
tematically deviate from holding a diversified portfolio. Therefore, it is optimal for
collectors of soft information companies to deviate from holding a diversified portfo-
lio. Instead, they choose to learn extensively about fewer stocks in hope of collecting
informational rents in the future. From Table 2 we can see how the average portfolio
weight is negatively correlated with the hierarchy score. This indicates that central-
ized funds tend to be more diversified than decentralized ones. We have also shown
that decentralized funds are able to forecast returns of soft information companies
and that they do a much better job in soft-information company investment than
centralized funds. It is therefore likely that part of the positive relationship between
outperformance and portfolio concentration can be explained by the organizational
form of funds that choose to hold diversified or concentrated funds. This is a very
interesting direction for future research.
few industries. Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2008) derive conditions under which deviating and
holding a concentrated portfolio is an optimal strategy. Bask Busse and Green (2006) discuss mutual
fund performance and managers’ willingness to take big bets in a relatively small number of stocks.
They document that concentrated managers tend to outperform their diversified counterparts
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Table 3: Determinants of Information Score
Dependent variable is the weighted average information score for each mutual fund portfolio in the
sample at a quarter -end date. HIERARCHY is the hierarchy score for each mutual fund in my
sample at each quarter-end date. GROWTH is a dummy variable for mutual funds that self-report
their investment mandate as growth. GR AND INC is a dummy variable for mutual funds that
self-report their investment style as growth and income or as balanced. FLOW is the log flow of new
funds into a fund and is defined as the difference between the log growth rate for TNA and the log
return for the fund in the current quarter. TNA is the fund’s total net assets under management.
PAST FLOW is the FLOW of the past quarter. Average R2 is the average R2 of all Fama-MacBeth
regressions. t-statistics are in parentheses.
Model
Panel A: Contemporaneous 1 2 3 4
INTERCEPT 7.03 6.30 6.32 6.32
HIERARCHY 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04
(3.90) (4.45) (4.94) (5.22)
GROWTH 0.64 0.64 0.65
(8.44) (8.56) (8.60)
GR AND IN 1.38 1.36 1.35
(13.18) (13.29) (13.25)
FLOW -0.72 -0.43
-(6.01) -(3.27)
PAST FLOW -0.57
-(4.31)
Average R2 0.39% 10.55% 11.89% 13.10%
Panel B: 6-Month Lag
INTERCEPT 7.00 6.31 6.32 6.33
HIERARCHY 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05
(4.86) (5.07) (5.28) (5.43)
GROWTH 0.59 0.60 0.60
(7.76) (7.83) (7.86)
GR AND IN 1.32 1.31 1.30
(12.55) (12.63) (12.62)
FLOW -0.69 -0.39
-(4.71) -(2.41)
PAST FLOW -0.54
-(3.98)
Average R2 0.57% 10.98% 12.22% 13.14%
Panel C: 12-Month Lag
INTERCEPT 7.02 6.38 6.38 6.39
HIERARCHY 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
(6.21) (6.53) (6.54) (6.63)
GROWTH 0.53 0.54 0.54
(7.56) (7.69) (7.70)
GR AND IN 1.24 1.22 1.21
(12.49) (12.62) (12.65)
FLOW -0.60 -0.35
-(4.20) -(1.98)
PAST FLOW -0.53
-(3.34)
Average R2 0.56% 10.52% 11.67% 12.66%
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Table 4: Self-financing trading strategy: Equally-Weighted Monthly Re-
gressions
Dependent variable is the self-financing trading strategy return each month. Each
quarter-end date I identify soft (hard) information companies held by centralised and
decentralised mutual funds. I take long positions in soft (hard) information companies
held by decentralised (centralised) funds and short positions in soft (hard) information
stocks held by centralised (decentralised) funds. The long and short portions of these
trading strategies are equally-weighted and are rebalanced every quarter. The three
Fama–French factors are zero-investment portfolios representing the excess return of
the market, Rm-Rf; the difference between a portfolio of “small” stocks and “big”
stocks, SMB; and the difference between a portfolio of “high” book-to-market stocks
and “low” book-to-market stocks, HML. The fourth factor, UMD, is the difference
between a portfolio of stocks with high past one-year returns minus a portfolio of
stocks with low past one-year returns. The fifth factor, LIQ, is the innovations in
the aggreagate level of liquidity in Pastor and Stambaugh (2003). N denotes the
number of monthly observations, R2 indicates the regression Adjusted R square and
t-statistics are in parentheses.
Mean Intercept Rm-Rf SMB HML UMD LIQ Adj R2 / N
Panel A: Soft Information Stocks Self-financing trading strategy
0.41%
(2.35)
0.37% 0.066 0.89%
(2.10) (1.57) 165
0.33% 0.040 0.193 0.026 9.49%
(1.91) (0.83) (3.87) (0.41) 165
0.33% 0.043 0.191 0.028 0.009 8.96%
(1.82) (0.87) (3.76) (0.43) (0.25) 165
0.33% 0.041 0.191 0.027 0.009 0.004 8.40%
(1.81) (0.79) (3.75) (0.41) (0.25) (0.12) 165
Panel B: Hard Information Stocks Self-financing trading strategy
0.03%
(1.55)
0.03% -0.001 -0.60%
(1.55) -(0.12) 165
0.02% 0.003 0.016 0.015 3.90%
(0.88) (0.60) (2.97) (2.20) 165
0.02% 0.002 0.016 0.014 -0.003 3.71%
(1.02) (0.36) (3.06) (2.11) -(0.83) 165
0.02% 0.001 0.016 0.013 -0.003 0.003 3.54%
(1.05) (0.10) (3.04) (1.98) -(0.80) (0.85) 165
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Table 5: Self-financing trading strategy: Average Abnormal Portfolio Tilts
Monthly Regressions
Dependent variable is the self-financing trading strategy return each month. Each
quarter-end date I identify soft (hard) information companies held by centralized and
decentralized mutual funds and their portfolio tilts in each mutual fund portfolio. A
Mutual portfolio tilt is defined as the portfolio weight of a holding divided by the
mean portfolio weight. I take long positions in soft (hard) information companies
held by decentralized (centralized) weighted by their normalized average abnormal
portfolio tilts and short positions in soft (hard) information stocks held by central-
ized (decentralized) funds weighted in the same fashion. The self-financing trading
strategy is financed each quarter. The other variables are defined as in table ?? N de-
notes the number of observations, and R2 indicates the regression Adjusted R square
and t-statistics are in parentheses.
Mean Intercept Rm-Rf SMB HML UMD LIQ Adj R2 / N
Panel A: Soft Information Stocks Self-financing trading strategy
0.55%
(2.80)
0.49% 0.102 2.2%
(2.47) (2.18) 165
0.45% 0.087 0.145 0.030 5.3%
(2.24) (1.59) (2.53) (0.41) 165
0.51% 0.067 0.158 0.021 -0.056 5.8%
(2.48) (1.18) (2.74) (0.28) -(1.39) 165
0.51% 0.062 0.158 0.018 -0.055 0.011 5.3%
(2.48) (1.04) (2.72) (0.24) -(1.38) (0.28) 165
Panel B: Hard Information Stocks Self-financing trading strategy
0.01%
(0.41)
0.01% 0.004 -0.4%
(0.31) (0.63) 165
0.05% -0.012 -0.036 -0.052 16.0%
(1.80) -(1.63) -(4.60) -(5.28) 165
0.03% -0.006 -0.040 -0.049 0.018 20.9%
(1.17) -(0.76) -(5.24) -(5.12) (3.34) 165
0.03% -0.007 -0.040 -0.050 0.018 0.003 20.6%
(1.18) -(0.90) -(5.24) -(5.14) (3.35) (0.58) 165
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Table 6: Fund-by-fund Self-financing trading strategy
Each quarter I identify funds that belong to the top and bottom quintile of the hier-
archy score (centralized and decentralized funds) that hold at least α% of their assets
in stocks that are above or below the information score. For each fund, the informa-
tion score is recalculated using the fund’s holdings only. The self financing trading
strategy is constructed by going long hard information companies (information score
= 10) and short soft information companies (information score = 1) for each fund at
the end of each quarter. I aggregate the return for the decentralized and centralized
fund strategies respectively. The dependent variable is the difference between the
average return for the centralized fund trading strategies and the the average return
for the centralized fund trading strategies. The strategies are held for a quarter and
rebalanced at the end of each quarter.
Mean Intercept Rm-Rf SMB HML UMD LIQ N / Adj R2
Panel A: α = 20%
0.22% 0.24% 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.03 165
(1.88) (1.91) (0.39) -(0.56) -(0.41) -(1.19) (1.23) 0.18%
Panel B: α = 25%
0.28% 0.28% 0.03 0.02 0.00 -0.04 0.03 165
(1.95) (1.82) (0.71) (0.46) (0.00) -(1.32) (0.94) 0.17%
Panel C: α = 30%
0.37% 0.41% -0.02 0.07 0.00 -0.06 0.02 165
(2.10) (2.15) -(0.35) (1.34) (0.01) -(1.61) (0.55) 0.00%
Panel D:α = 35%
0.38% 0.35% -0.01 0.06 0.10 -0.04 0.06 165
(1.77) (1.53) -(0.22) (0.97) (1.17) -(0.91) (1.33) 0.00%
Panel E:α = 40%
0.61% 0.58% -0.08 0.13 0.05 -0.01 0.16 165
(2.00) (1.80) -(0.86) (1.46) (0.47) -(0.15) (2.62) 2.51%
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Table 7: Cross-sectional Regressions
Cross-sectional regressions are run at the end of each month t from April 1993 to
March 2007. The Dependent variable is the return over month t+1. B/M is the
log of one plus the book value of equity. TURN (turnover) is the log of one plus
monthly trading volume scaled by shares outstanding, averaged over the previous
three months. VOL (volatility) is the standard deviation of monthly individual stock
returns over the previous 12 months. RET12 (momentum) is the total individual
stock returns over the previous 12 months. SOFT is a dummy for soft information
companies. HARD is a dummy is a dummy for hard information companies. DEC is
the average ”abnormal” portfolio tilt of decentralized funds, where abnormal tilt of a
mutual fund holding is defined as the holding’s portfolio weight divided by the mean
weight in the portfolio. CEN is the average ”abnormal” portfolio tilt of decentralized
funds.
Model
Predictor Variable 1 2 3
B/M 0.0037 0.0037 0.0036
(3.29) (3.21) (3.15)
RET12 0.0057 0.0058 0.0059
(1.79) (1.81) (1.83)
TURN -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0002
-(0.12) -(0.20) -(0.16)
VOL -0.0148 -0.0133 -0.0141
-(0.68) -(0.63) -(0.67)
HARD 0.0004 0.0045
(0.26) (1.92)
SOFT -0.0015 -0.0015
-(1.27) -(1.02)
HARD X DEC -0.0046
-(2.03)
SOFT X DEC 0.0048
(2.11)
HARD X CEN -0.0030
-(1.29)
SOFT X CEN -0.0059
-(2.21)
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